

# Field Report regarding Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project



**September 2008**



**Mekong Watch**

## **Introduction**

From 29 August to 5 September 2008, Mekong Watch organized a study tour in Laos, and conducted field visits and interviews regarding the Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project (hereafter the “Project”), funded by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and implemented by the Nam Theun 2 Power Company (NTPC). Places visited during the tour include: 3 resettlement villages in Nakai Plateau, NTPC Thakhek office, Resettlement Management Unit (RMU) of Nakai district, and the World Bank and ADB Offices in Vientiane. Please refer to the Appendix 1 for more details on the study tour schedule.

Under the Project, situated in Nakai Plateau, reservoir impoundment began in April 2008, and the resettlement of communities is completed, with the exception of a few households. While the Project continues to move forward, we are seriously concerned that the Project’s social and environmental impacts have not been adequately addressed. Problems identified during the visits are explained below:

### **1. Current Situation of the Resettlement Areas and Issues**

#### **1) Livelihoods Restoration Programs**

The Social Development Plan (SDP), prepared for the Project, states that livelihoods of resettled communities are to be restored through 5 programs, each focusing on agriculture, forestry, fishery, livestock rearing, and small-scale business. These programs are implemented by NTPC. Our field visit and interviews found that all of the 5 programs are neither appropriately implemented nor so far successful.

- **Agriculture**

According to Mr. Olaivanh, a staff member of NTPC in charge of the livelihood restoration program on agriculture, villagers practiced rotational shifting cultivation before resettlement. Since villagers are no longer able to rotate farmland following impoundment, upland rice production can not be practiced on the same site year after year as soil would become depleted. Through the livelihoods restoration program, therefore, villagers are encouraged to grow cash crops,

namely Job's tear, beans, corns, and pasture grass. In case villagers wish to grow rice, the program promotes that villagers space rice cultivation 3 years apart. During the 2 years in between, villagers are to focus on cash cropping, and purchase rice. Mr. Olaivanh also explained that, by growing pasture grass and sending cattle to graze in the compensation farmland, quality of soil will improve with the pasture and cattle’s feces. It is an efficient way of farming because it does not require burning, cultivation, or mowing.



Livestock fodder being grown on experimental farm in a resettlement village

According to our interviews with resettled villagers, however, they are not able to support themselves by agriculture on compensation farmland. A woman in Sop Hia village told us that, while she grows both rice and pasture grass on the compensation farmland, the only reason that she is growing pasture is to improve the soil. She does not have any cattle. Another woman in Nakai Neua village grows rice, cucumbers, and corn using swidden method, and raises 4 buffalos on the compensation farmland. Both of women in Sop Hia village and Nakai Neua village do not foresee that they will be able to produce sufficient amount of rice to sustain their families, or make enough cash to purchase rice in the future.

One of the problems villagers are facing is that the compensation farmland is poor in soil quality, and insufficient in size to produce enough rice or other crops to sustain their livelihoods. Resettled communities receive 0.66 hectare of compensation farmland per a household. Mr. Hoy Phomvisouk, Manager, RMU, Thakhek District Office, admitted that 0.66 hectare is enough for a small family, but may be insufficient for a household with many family members.

Mr. Hoy said that problems will be addressed as they arise, and that providing an additional 1 hectare per a household for vegetable

farming and grazing is now being considered. The additional land would be on the drawdown area of the reservoir, the area that will not be inundated during the dry season. “Update on the Lao PDR Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project”, released in July 2008 by the World Bank and ADB, also writes that: “Preparation for future recession agriculture in the Drawdown Zones has progressed, with physical surveys of each village highlighting and marking out priority areas for unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance in the center and northern areas” (p.7). However, the SDP notes the uncertainty of the drawdown zone for agricultural production stating: “... the exact nature of this drawdown zone of the reservoir is difficult to predict, and will only be known after some years of operation of the reservoir...” (12.5.3).

Regarding the quality of soil in the resettlement area, Mr. Hoy of RMU told Mekong Watch that the land in this area is highly acidic, and thus the soil is not suitable for rice cultivation. He also said that soil in the area does not retain much water. Similarly, Mr. Edvard Baardsen, Senior Infrastructure Specialist, Infrastructure Division, Southeast Asia Department, ADB, said that he is aware that the word “Nakai” in Lao means “land where rice cannot be produced”. He admitted that the salinity level in the area is high, and rice production is difficult. He said that there is a need to enable villagers to get rice from other means of livelihoods.

As explained above, the condition of the compensation farmland is far from sufficient or appropriate. Mr. William Rex, Lead Country Officer, World Bank, told Mekong Watch that the villagers have been informed at a number of consultation meetings before the resettlement that the potential for agriculture in the area is small, as the

availability of land is limited and the soil quality is poor. Furthermore, the reason why the compensation farmland is small is that the villagers wished to stay in Nakai Plateau, close to their original villages. Mr. Rex explained that the World Bank and NTPC respected the wishes of the villagers.

However, the responsibility for the problems must not be obscured by saying that it was the result of the villagers' "choice." The plan to construct irrigation facilities and terraced rice fields to enable cultivation of rice was never implemented. Claiming that wet rice cultivation will be possible in the resettlement area, SDP proposes the above plan, and states:

*...Some households will initially continue to plant upland rice in [compensation farmland], but most will gradually change to production to the irrigated paddy, where technically and economically feasible and especially after the Nakai reservoir in operation. Paddy land will be located on the lower terraces, where slopes are less, and the land contiguous to the drawdown zones where cropping may also be developed, including mid to late dry season paddy rice. Both wet and dry season paddy can be grown or dry season crops such as water melon grown in the formed paddy areas (12.5.1).*

According to Mr. Hoy of RMU, this plan was dropped because a study showed that the Nakai Plateau is not suitable for paddy cultivation, as the acidity level of soil is as high as pH4.8. At the time the plan was being developed, however, it was already known that the land in Nakai Plateau is highly acidic. The soil study described in the SDP found high levels of acidity, pH KCl 4.1 and pH H<sub>2</sub>O 4.9, at the pilot village in Nakai Plateau (see Table 21-2). Hence it remains

unclear as to why the original plans from the SDP to develop terraced rice paddy have been dropped.

In addition, the SDP states that large inputs of agricultural lime, organic and inorganic fertilizer will be required for productive agriculture on these largely infertile soils (section 12.6 and Footnote [a] Table 12.16), yet under the ad hoc manner of the upland rice cultivation presently being conducted by villagers in the resettlement areas, it would appear that these inputs have yet to be made.

Another serious concern regarding the livelihoods restoration program on agriculture is that, even if resettled villagers are able to produce cash crops, whether or not there is a market for such crops is still uncertain. Although support for cash crop cultivation has already begun as early as in 2002 at the pilot village, NTPC is still in the process of seeking market opportunities.



Produce from Thailand on sale in Nakai market

When Mekong Watch visited a local market in Nakai, we found vegetables imported from Thailand through Thakhek, among others, but could not find any produced by the resettled villages. Mr. Rex of the World Bank explained that it is difficult to find a market immediately, since the villagers relocated only recently. However, considering that market has not been identified after 6 years

since the pilot project for cash crop cultivation begun in 2002, it would appear to be highly questionable as to whether a market for cash crops actually exists. Moreover, according to the presentation by Mr. Hoy of the RMU, the number of workers employed for the Project is expected to decrease after reaching its peak of 12,000 in 2008. This suggests that the scale of market demand in Nakai is likely to be reduced in the future. Mr. Hoy claims that the scale of market in Nakai can be maintained through promoting tourism in the future. However, presently, there is no known concrete plan to promote tourism in the area.

#### ● **Collection of NTFP and Forestry**

Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFP) are an important source of food and cash income for villagers in Nakai Plateau. Villagers were once able to collect NTFP in abundance from the forests in the Project area, including bamboo shoots and *khisi* (resin). However, most of these forests are now inundated by the reservoir. Furthermore, some remaining forests are designated as the project watershed area, and collection of NTFP in the area is now banned. As a result, villagers are facing great difficulties.

During the interview, a woman from Nakai Neua village complained that the forest where she used to get bamboo shoots, wild vegetables, and *khisi* is now under water. Nowadays, she has to walk to a forest far from the village. According to the villagers, *khisi* can be sold to middleperson for 2,000 kips per kilogram, and is an important source of income for villagers. A villager said that men in the village take one full day by hand-stroked boat to the project watershed area, far from the resettlement village, in order to extract *khisi*. According to the villager, they have had the customary rights

to use the area, and have taken *khisi* for years. However, under the watershed management plan of the Project, NTFP collection in the watershed area is now prohibited.

While resettled communities lost their forests to the reservoir and the Project's watershed management plan, they have not received any support to address this issue. It should be noted that the need to find new places to gather NTFP was already recognized during the planning stage for the Project. The SDP states: "Current NTFP collection sites include those that would be flooded, and once resettled, villages would need to relocate their NTFP collection sites" (14.4.5).

According to RMU, villagers from 15 resettled villages will receive the right to use a total of 20,800 ha of forest as a form of compensation. The rights will be for 70 years, and can be extended as needed. The plan is to use the forest for a program to restore livelihoods through forestry. However, in the SDP, it was stated that there was a total of 18,106 ha of forest area in the production forest zone, yet "only about 5,590 ha of the 18,106 ha forested land can be considered for commercial production in the short to medium term" (14.1.2).

Furthermore, Mr. Rex of the World Bank said that the decision whether to use forest land for forestry as planned, or whether to convert more forest land for farming is a choice that will need to be made in the future, suggesting that there is a possibility that forest may be converted into farmland. If forest is converted into farmland in order to compensate for flaws in the agricultural livelihoods restoration program, benefits from forest, to which affected communities are entitled, will be lost.

#### ● **Fishery**

NTPC promotes fishery in the reservoir as one of the livelihoods restoration programs. One hand-stroke boat was provided per 2 resettled households. However, since reservoir was filled before removing biomass sufficiently, it is not clear whether the planned amount of catch can be realized. The issue of biomass in the reservoir will be discussed in detail later in this paper.

Furthermore, villagers reported a case of boat accident in the reservoir. Resettled villagers in Nakai Neua village reported that the wake created by an NTPC speed boat had capsized the boat of a man from Nakai Neua village. As a result, the villager drowned to death. According to the villagers, the fact that the man was neither experienced in swimming nor accustomed to fishing in the reservoir where water is deep may have contributed to his death. A woman we interviewed at Sop Hia village said that she had heard about the accident. She said that she fishes in the river, not reservoir, because she is scared of such accidents.

### ● **Livestock Rearing**

For local communities in Nakai Plateau, Livestock rearing is important for both economic and social reasons. However, Mr. Hoy of RMU said that villagers' cows and buffalos are to be reduced from 4,500 in year 2007 to 2,500 by year 2010. In fact, according to the villagers, many villagers had to give up their livestock upon resettlement.

Furthermore, even with the reduced number of livestock, resettled villagers are facing severe difficulties rearing livestock in the resettlement area. During our recent visit, we observed that the villagers were keeping their livestock at a section of the compensation farmland of 0.66 hectare, or inside the

villages. A woman from Nakai Neua village lets 4 buffalos graze in the compensation farmland, since there is no other place for grazing after the reservoir was filled. She complained that there is not enough pasture to feed her buffalos. The family across from her house kept their cows on leash under their house. The woman said that their cows became skinny after not having enough pasture to eat, and that no one would be interested to buy cows in such bad condition.

Mr. Olaivanh of NTPC admitted that the pasture on 0.66 hectare of compensation farmland can sustain only few buffalos, if any. It takes at least 1.2 hectare of pasture to raise 1 to 3 buffalos if they are released on grazing fields, or 7 buffalos if raised in fenced-in lots. In addition, he suggested that as it was not possible for villagers to farm rice year after year that they should intermittently plant grass for livestock fodder to improve soil fertility. His comments implied that villagers would only grow grass fodder for one in every three years.

### ● **Small-Scale Business**

According to our interview with resettled villagers who engage in small-scale businesses, such as textile production and small-scale retail, they are having difficulties finding customers and market opportunities. As the construction workers for the Project are leaving the area, and there are no concrete plans for tourism promotion, the path to establishing livelihoods through small-scale businesses also seems uncertain.

In Sop Hia village, 6 households out of the total of 40 households in the village participate in textile-making. According to a villager, it takes one full day to produce 1 to 2 pieces of fabric, priced at 20,000 kip each. Because cotton flower in the area is of poor

quality, cotton purchased by NTPC from Vientiane is used, and the material costs 10,000 kip. While there is a plan to grow cotton in the compensation farmland, it may take a long time before the villagers are able to manage the process, from procuring the materials to selling the products, on their own. Presently, villagers are not able to produce much, as they had received training in textile-making only recently. The market for their product has not been identified. So

far, villagers have sold their products to a few visitors only.

There are also families that have small-scale shops in front of their resettled houses. An owner of the general shop at Nakai Neua village said that construction workers for the dam are leaving the area and the number of customers are decreasing. As a result, profit from the general shop has reduced.

## **2) Food Aid**

During the transition period after the resettlement, NTPC is to provide food aid to resettled villagers, including rice, meat, and fish. According to Mr. Hoy of RMU, food aid is to be continued for 18 months. In the resettlement villages we visited, villagers were receiving monthly ration of 18 kg of rice per adult and 12 kg per a child. While the livelihoods restoration programs have not been successful so far, Mr. Duy-Thanh Bui, Energy Economist, Infrastructure Division, Southeast Asia Department, ADB, said that NTPC must improve the lives of the villagers, and provide support to the villagers if their livelihoods are not sufficiently restored.

the same village, who lives with her husband and 2 teenage children, said that her family consumes about 70 kg of rice every month. Although she currently grows rice on a part of the 0.66 ha compensation farmland, she does not expect to harvest more than 300 kg. She complained that her family is not able to survive solely on the rice they produce, and is very worried about the future. If the information villagers have is accurate, food aid to Nakai Neua village will be terminated only after half year since they were resettled in March to April 2008.

However, resettled villagers we interviewed have heard that rice aid from NTPC will be terminated in October or November this year. According to a woman from Sop Hia village, who lives with her husband and 2 young children, her family receives a total of 48kg of rice every month. She has heard that the food aid will be stopped in October. Similarly, A woman from Nakai Neua village also said that she heard that food aid will be stopped in October. She said that she may be able to produce some rice by October 2009, but if the aid is stopped before then, she has no idea how to feed her family. Another woman from

Mr. Hoy of RMU said that food aid will be continued, if there are clear and valid reasons why villagers need food aid. According to Mr. Hoy, if the reason villagers do not have enough rice is because they are “lazy”, RMU will not provide aid. To determine whether or not the resettled villagers are “lazy”, he said that RMU will commission a Thai expert to conduct an income study. If the villagers’ income is found to be insufficient, the same expert will investigate why. However, if the continuation of food aid is to be determined based on a subjective judgment on whether the resettled 1,296 households are “lazy” or not, it is possible that some households would not be able to receive appropriate aid.

Mr. Rex of the World Bank, said that it is the responsibility of NTPC to ensure that resettled communities are able to feed themselves. He also emphasized that communities in Nakai have not produced enough rice to feed themselves even before they were relocated. According to Mr. Rex, food aid is a sensitive issue, and appropriate attention should be paid so that independence of villagers is not undermined by food aid.

However, it should be highlighted that, before the reservoir impoundment, villagers were able to collect NTFP from forest. When there were not enough rice, villagers were able to sell NTFP to get cash and buy rice, or

at least supplement with potatoes and bamboo shoots from forest and farm. Currently, villagers are not able to harvest enough from the compensation farmland, or generate enough income from growing cash crops or other livelihoods restoration programs to purchase rice. Under such circumstance, NTPC must not stop the food aid in the name of promoting villagers' independence. Moreover, NTPC must clearly inform resettled communities that food aid will be continued until communities' livelihoods restoration is achieved. Villagers should not be left worried that food aid may be terminated while they are not able to restore their livelihoods.

### **3) Grievance Mechanism**

Mr. Hoy of RMU said that there have been 52 cases of complaints filed to the grievance mechanism, 30 of which were resolved at the village level, and 22 resolved at the district level. All have been resolved before reaching the provincial level. However, our interviews with villagers found that there are cases that villagers are not able to use the grievance mechanism even though they have serious concerns about their situations.

As mentioned earlier, resettled communities are facing severe difficulties sustaining their families, and are concerned that the food aid may be stopped soon. However, communities reported that they have no means to raise their concerns to NTPC. According to our interviews, villagers believed that it would be a political mistake to complain directly to the company, and that complaints must be made through village chief. At the same time, they assume that village chief would not complain to the company on their behalf, because the village chief, as with other influential people

in the village, enjoys benefits from the Project. A villager said that there are some influential people in the village who work as staff members of NTPC or as forestry workers in the VFA, and receive monthly salaries from NTPC. As a result, she commented that the discrepancy between those who can receive benefits from the Project and those who cannot is widening within the village.

As for the boat accident and the consequent death of the Nakai Neua village described earlier, the family of the deceased is demanding compensation from NTPC. Villagers in Nakai Neua reported that compensation has not been paid, and that they are not sure if it will ever be paid. Neither the World Bank nor ADB had any knowledge about this accident until they were informed by Mekong Watch. Mr. Baardsen of ADB said that the boat case was an accident, and was not the problem caused by the project. According to Mr. Baardsen,



the grievance mechanism is for regular issues, such as compensation, and has been functioning under the normal circumstances.

However, it was apparent even from our short field visit that the grievance mechanism in its current form has failed to address the

#### 4) Biomass Clearance

The original plan for the project is to clear vegetation in the reservoir area before impoundment. SDP states that "...in an effort to ensure reasonably good water quality in the first few years after impoundment, residual biomass (above and under ground) at Nakai Plateau must be removed as much as possible, particularly in those reservoir areas that will be permanently inundated during reservoir operation" (15.5.1.1). The Environmental Assessment and Management Plan (EAMP) also writes that "Vegetation will be removed before flooding the reservoir... The priority shall be to clear the vegetation in areas which will be permanently flooded. The results of the ongoing biomass survey of the inundation area will be used as a means for maximizing removal in areas of high biomass" (Chapter 3, p. 92).

Nevertheless, reservoir impoundment began before sufficiently removing biomass in the area. At the time of our visit, the reservoir was filled 4 m short of full level. In the reservoir, we observed trees left in the water in many places.

Mr. Hoy of RMU admitted that biomass was not cleared sufficiently and, as a result, the quality of reservoir water may be degraded. According to Mr. Hoy, a set of measures are planned to improve the water quality in the reservoir. The plan is to leave the vegetation

concerns of the resettled villagers. Without improving the mechanism or establishing other ways to hear and respond to the villagers' concerns, voices of affected communities who are politically or socially disadvantaged, e.g. poor in village, will not be delivered to project executing agency.

under water to degrade until the beginning of the year 2009, flush the water from the reservoir, and then fill the reservoir again with fresh water. Mr. Rex of the World Bank also explained that flushing degraded water from reservoir is one of the approaches used in the world's giant dams to improve water quality.



Trees left standing in the reservoir as it fills

However, if degraded water is drained from the reservoir, it is possible that aquatic organisms, fisheries, and domestic water use in the downstream area will be adversely affected. Since the original plan was to clear biomass to prevent water quality degradation, there are no studies on the downstream impacts from flushing the degraded water. Mitigation and compensation measures to address the potential downstream impacts are also not prepared.

## 5) Conservation of Wildlife

According to Mr. Jean Copreaux, Environmental & Social Deputy Director, Environmental & Social Division, Nam Theun 2 Power Company (NTPC) Thakhek office, 4,000 km<sup>3</sup> has been designated as National Biodiversity Conservation Area (NBCA), and the project to conserve wildlife is ongoing. Forty species around the reservoir are designated as protected species. After the impoundment, wildlife left on the islands in the reservoir are being transported to the NBCA. According to Mr. Hoy of RMU, wildlife and livestock are left on the islands, including 4 Asian Elephants.

According to EAMP, a wildlife rescue plan was to be established and operated before the reservoir impoundment. EAMP states:

*When the reservoir fills, wildlife will be drowned, displaced or stranded on the islands formed. Gradual filling of the reservoir to resemble natural floods may eventually cause many animals to move to higher ground. However, specialists will need to be identified at least a year before the planned inundation, and a wildlife rescue plan will have to be established and fully operational at least six months before the planned inundation (EAMP, Chapter 3, p.130 ).*

However, it is highly questionable that the wildlife rescue plan was appropriately implemented, considering that wildlife, even the endangered species, are still left on the island in the reservoir.

## 2. Conclusion and Recommendations

From our field visit and interviews, many plans described in SDP and EAMP, including the development of paddy fields and clearing of biomass, were found not implemented appropriately. Regarding the livelihoods restoration programs, there are problems with finding markets for cash crops and small-scale businesses. Regarding agriculture, rice paddies described in the SDP were not provided to the resettled villagers. The resettled communities have begun upland rice cultivation using swidden methods on the compensation farmland. However, the soil quality is poor, and upland rice cultivation in 0.66 ha of farmland cannot be a sustainable livelihood. NTPC, as well as the World Bank and ADB that support the Project, must prepare alternative plans for livelihood restoration.

Regarding fisheries in reservoir, there is a concern about the water quality since biomass was not sufficiently cleared as planned. Furthermore, there was a fatal boat accident in the reservoir. It is necessary to prepare safety management measures, including navigation rules.

The traditional NTFP collection sites of resettled villagers have been lost due both to reservoir

impoundment, and the creation of the NBCA. However, the Project has failed to prepare alternative sites for villagers to ensure the villagers' access to NTFP resources. Measures should be prepared to address the difficulties villagers are facing in collecting NTFP, which are an important source of livelihoods and income.

For local communities in the Nakai Plateau, livestock rearing is important for both economic and social reasons. However, many villagers have had to give up major portions of their livestock upon resettlement. Even with the reduced number of livestock, resettled communities report that they are facing severe difficulties in rearing livestock because there is not enough land for grazing or growing pasture in the resettlement area. Villagers are concerned about the health of their livestock. More land for grazing, support for livestock raising techniques, and/or appropriate compensation must be provided to affected communities.

Under such circumstances, some villagers have been told that food aid will be terminated in October or November this year, and are strongly concerned. Food aid is absolutely necessary when villagers are neither able to produce enough rice from cultivating compensation farmland, nor gain sufficient income from cash cropping or other livelihoods restoration programs to purchase rice.

Our interviews found that there are villagers who are not able to use the grievance mechanism even though they are not satisfied with the project's mitigation and compensation measures. NTPC, as well as the World Bank and ADB, should ensure that the voices of the politically disadvantaged are heard and addressed.

Biomass was not sufficiently cleared before the reservoir impoundment. The plan is to leave the vegetation under water to degrade until the beginning of year 2009, flush the water from the reservoir, and then fill the reservoir again with fresh water. However, if degraded water is drained from the reservoir, it is possible that aquatic organisms, fisheries, and domestic water use in the downstream area will be adversely affected. Since the original plan was to clear biomass to prevent water quality degradation, there are no studies on the downstream impacts from flushing the degraded water. Mitigation and compensation measures to address the potential downstream impacts are also not prepared. If degraded water from the reservoir will be flushed, the environmental and social impacts in the downstream area must be studied. The study findings, as well as the measures to avoid or mitigate the impacts, must be disclosed to the public, and the communities along the downstream Xe Bang Fai River must be consulted.

NTPC, as the executing company, and the World Bank and ADB, as the funders of the Project, must fulfill their responsibility to ensure that mitigation measures for the project's social and environmental impacts are appropriately implemented, and the issues that were not expected at the time of planning are appropriately addressed.

## **Appendix 1: Study Tour Schedule**

Sunday, 31 August 2008

- Move from Vientiane to Thakhek, Lao PDR.

Monday, 1 September 2008

- Meeting with Mr. Jean Copreaux, Environmental & Social Deputy Director, Environmental & Social Division, Nam Theun 2 Power Company (NTPC) Thakhek office at his office.
- Move from Thakhek to Nakai. Visit to a channel in downstream and power plant.
- Meeting with Mr. Hoy Phomvisouk, Manager, Resettlement Management Unit, Nakai District Office, Lao PDR, at his office.
- Visit to the water intake opening.

Tuesday, 2 September 2008

- Visit to the local market at Oudomsouk.
- Meeting with Mr. Olaivanh, a staff member in charge of agriculture livelihoods restoration project at NTPC, at the NTPC Thakhek office.
- Visit to resettlement villages (Nakai Tai, Sop Hia and Nakai Neua)

Wednesday, 3 September 2008

- Meeting with Mr. William Rex, Lead Country Officer, World Bank, at the World Bank Office in Vientiane.

Thursday, 4 September 2008

- Meeting with Mr. Duy-Thanh Bui, Energy Economist, Infrastructure Division, Southeast Asia Department, ADB, at the ADB office in Vientiane. Mr. Edvard Baardsen, Senior Infrastructure Specialist, Infrastructure Division, Southeast Asia Department, and Mr. Gil-Hong Kim, Country Director, Lao People's Democratic Republic Resident Mission, ADB, also attended the meeting.

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