Since World War II some 45,000 large dams have been built, generating an estimated 20 percent of the world’s electricity and providing irrigation to fields that produce some 10 percent of the world’s food. The harnessing of wild rivers has not, however, occurred without considerable human and environmental cost. Dams flood some of the most productive agricultural lands in the world. Large dams and water diversions are the primary cause of endangerment or extinction for half of the world’s fresh water fish, and changes in downstream water quality have decimated the fisheries, waterfowl and mammals of the world’s deltas. For the 40 to 80 million people whose lives and livelihood were rooted in the banks and valleys of wild rivers, dam development has profoundly altered the health, economy, and culture of communities, and entire nations. In India alone, more than 20 million people have been forcefully evicted from their homes to make way for water development projects, and as many as 75 percent of these people have not received adequate compensation or assistance in rebuilding their lives.
Because dams are generally situated near the ancient homes of indigenous nations or the relatively recent refuge for survivors of colonial expansion, it is rural and ethnic minorities who are typically forced to pay the ultimate price. Their very marginality –– their geographic and social distance from the central corridors of power –– weakens the power of their protests. Ill–considered development plans, forced evictions, resettlement with inadequate compensation generate conditions and conflicts that threaten the security of individual and group rights to culture, self–determination, livelihood, and life itself.
These dynamics are illustrated in the case of the Chixoy Dam in Guatemala, a dam built to power a hydroelectric generation facility that now provides 80 percent of that nation’s electricity. It was planned and developed by INDE (National Institute for Electrification) at a time when Guatemala was riven by civil war and largely financed with loans from the Inter–American Development Bank and the World Bank. Designs were approved and construction begun without notifying the local population, conducting a comprehensive survey of affected peoples, or addressing compensation and resettlement for the 3,400 mostly Mayan residents. With dam construction well underway, title to land yet to be acquired, and a new World Bank loan demanding a resettlement plan, the military dictatorship of Lucas Garcia declared the Chixoy Dam site and surrounding region a militarized zone in 1978.
Some villagers accepted resettlement offers but found poorer quality housing, smaller acreage and infertile land. Others refused to move and attempted to negotiate more equitable terms. Tensions escalated as the remaining villagers were declared subversive, community records of resettlement promises and land documents seized, and community leaders killed. Following a second military coup in March of 1982, General Rios Montt initiated a “scorched earth” policy against Guatemala’s Mayan population. As construction on the dam was completed and floodwaters began to rise, villages were emptied at gunpoint and homes and fields burned. Massacres ensued, including in villages that provided refuge to survivors. By September 1982, in one village alone 487 people –– half the population of Rio Negro –– had been murdered.
Following the 1994 Oslo Peace Accords ending Guatemala’s civil war, a series of investigations broke the silence over the massacres. In 1999 a United Nations–sponsored commission concluded that more than 200,000 Mayan civilians had been killed, that acts of genocide were committed against specific Mayan communities, and that the Government of Guatemala was responsible for 93 percent of the human rights violations and acts of violence against civilians.
Today, the issue is far from settled. The failure to provide equivalent size and quality of farm and household land for the resettled has produced severe poverty, widespread hunger, and high malnutrition rates. Communities that were excluded from the resettlement program also struggle with an array of problems. Dam releases occur with no warning and resulting flashfloods destroy crops, drown livestock, and sometimes kill people. Most inhabitants of former fishing villages, their livelihoods destroyed, have turned to migrant labor. Upstream communities saw part of their agricultural land flooded, and access to land, roads, and regional markets cut off. No mechanism exists for affected people to complain or negotiate assistance. In 1998, INDE’s resettlement office was closed and resettlement village residents were no longer able to file claims and secure meaningful remedy.
In recent years Chixoy Dam–affected communities have met to discuss common problems and strategies, testified before truth commissions, and, with help from national and international advocates, are working to document the dam’s impact. With research completed and no means to articulate findings or negotiate settlements, in September 2004, some 800 Mayan farmers occupied the dam, threatening to cut power supplies unless they were compensated for land and lives lost. An agreement to begin negotiations was signed by Government representatives on September 9, 2004. In November 2004, the Chixoy Dam Legacy Issues Study was reviewed by an international panel of social impact assessment and resettlement experts. This review took place in Santa Fe, New Mexico and was cosponsored and findings endorsed by the Center for Political Ecology; International Rivers; The Cornerhouse; The American Association for the Advancement of Science, Science and Human Rights Program; The Society for Applied Anthropology; The American Anthropological Association Committee for Human Rights; and, The International Resettlement and Displacement Network. Findings include recognition that significant violations of law and financial institution procedures occurred, that financial institutions as well as host government agencies and private contractors share liability, and considerable obligations remain. In it’s “Santa Fe Group Statement” the peer review panel called for an array of actions including a two–pronged negotiations process that allows independent examination of claims, neutral mediation, and the provision of remedies that address immediate urgent needs as well as the long–term socioeconomic needs of the communities and the region.
In documenting the many failures to properly address rights and resources, the Chixoy dam–affected communities have taken the lead in challenging the assumptions that drive development decision–making and demanding institutional accountability. Their demands for “reparations” are much more than cries for compensation –– they are demands for meaningful remedy. Meaningful remedy means that free, prior and informed consent of resident peoples is obtained before financing is approved and dam construction initiated; that scientific assessments and plans are developed with the equitable participation of affected–community members; that governments and financiers respect the rights of indigenous peoples to self–determination, including the right to say no; and, that new projects are not funded until the outstanding legacy issues from past projects are addressed.
This originally appeared in State of the World 2005, by WorldWatch Institute.